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FAILING TO BRIDGE THE GAP:
SOMALIA’S PERENNIAL
TRADE DEFICIT (1960-1990)
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I. Introduction
Throughout the three post-independence decades (the 1960s, 70s, and
80s), the Somali economy was characterized by a considerably alarming foreign aid dependency1 and an ever-growing external borrowing.2
Even though other factors shall not necessarily be ruled out, the most
plausible economic explanation of this phenomenon is that the government used the external aid and debt to finance its chronic balance of
payments deficits.
The balance of payments, in simple terms, is where the records of
the nation’s international transactions (payments to and receipts from
foreign countries) are kept for a certain period of time, often a year.3
A nation’s balance of payments is composed of the current account,
financial account, and capital account. The current account keeps the
record of the balance of goods and services (trade balance), investment
income, and unilateral transfers,4 and it is the most important (and
often the largest) of the three accounts while the capital account is the
smallest. Although trade balance includes the balance of both goods
and services, we mainly focus on the merchandise trade balance (the
balance of goods/commodities) in this paper. Similar to the majority
of the developing countries, Somalia exported primary products and
imported manufactured and capital goods, among other commodities.
Thus, the available exports and imports data is primarily that of goods
or commodities. The data do not capture the services that the country
likely imported in this period.

194

Muhumed Mohamed Mohomud

Developing countries greatly rely on commodity exports which
account for a substantial share of their GDPs and a sizable portion
of their export earnings. However, such commodity exports reliance
is associated with greater uncertainties due to volatile markets and
prices. We will see in a moment how changes to the banana prices in
the global markets massively affected the Somali banana industry in
certain times. On the contrary, developing economies’ acute dependence on manufactured, consumer, and capital goods imports for local
consumption and production, usually coupled with lower revenues,
also resulted in a balance of payments problems – chronic current
account deficits, often offset by capital account surplus (external debt
and investment) became the norm.5 The Somali economy suffered
from a persistent balance of payments deficits in most of the period
under study. In 1985, for instance, the balance of payments deficit
was US$300 million or, to put it another way, 22 percent of the GDP.6
However, while underlining that the statistics reported by the government were flawed in a number of ways, the World Bank (1981) report
emphasized that the economy enjoyed a favorable balance of payments
position in the early 1970s. Whilst Somalia’s balance of payments
difficulties could have been unique and had their own causes, the
balance of payments of the developing countries deteriorated in the
1980s and 1990s on the ground of a decline in commodity prices, intensifying protectionism in the advanced countries, recessions shrinking
the international trade, and inadequate exchange rate policies often
leading to currency overvaluation in certain developing nations.7 The
next sections will demonstrate whether Somalia shared these reasons
with the rest of the developing economies.
his article aims to examine Somalia’s trade deficits in 1960-1991
and particularly focuses on the merchandise trade balance. The study
covers the period between the independence (1960) and the state collapse (1991) and attempts to understand the role Somalia played in the
global economy, especially global trade, during those three decades
the Somali people witnessed a functioning state of theirs.
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II. Foreign Trade
The Somali economy has always been a highly open economy as
the exports and imports accounted for a substantial portion of the
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – an average of 55 percent
between 1970 and 1990.8 Despite trading with the rest of the world,
Somalia’s “role in the world economy has long been that of a supplier
of primary products and an importer of manufactures.”9 The agricultural and pastoral sectors are the most significant sectors of the
Somali economy serving as primary sources of production and export
earnings. In the period under study, over 90 percent of the total export
earnings were generated by the livestock and banana exports, livestock being the dominant export product which accounted for 40-85
percent of earnings.10 Livestock exports were so essential to the Somali
economy that they accounted for 91 percent of the country’s hard currency inflow in 1981.11 If we add fishing to these two sectors, the role
is even bigger. According to Abdi Samatar (1988:89), “[t]he rural sector
(pastoral, agriculture, and fisheries) is the largest in the Somali economy, accounting for two-thirds of the gross national product (GNP),
four-fifths of the labour force, and about 98% of the exports.” However, notwithstanding the rhetoric of aiming for food sufficiency by the
successive Somali governments, chiefly the military regime, the local
production in Somalia, particularly in the area of food, often failed to
meet the increasing domestic consumption. As a result, between the
mid-1970s and the late 1980s, “Somalia has become alarmingly, and
more than any other country in Sub-Saharan Africa, dependent on
imported food.”12
Somalia exported live animals to the Gulf Countries and banana to
Europe. In spite of these two primary products, hides and skins, frankincense and myrrh, meat and meat products, and fish and fish products were also exported as elaborated in the next sections. In contrast,
Somalia imported food, fuel, machinery, electronics, transportation,
and medicine, among other things from different parts of the world.
III. Exports
Livestock and banana, as already mentioned, are the primary export
products and account for over 90 percent of export earnings. They
are also crucial for the domestic employment, income generation, and
196

Muhumed Mohamed Mohomud

government revenues. Other livestock products – hides and skins,
meat and meat products – also trivially contributed to the export earnings. Frankincense, myrrh, and fish exports played a minor role in
export earnings as well. Apparently, pastoral and agricultural sectors
remained to be the most important sectors of the Somali economy.
In the period of 1975-1985, export earnings peaked in 1982 with
USD 137 million and hit rock bottom in 1984 with just USD 62 million. Furthermore, export earnings were USD 71.3 million in 1977 but
almost doubled and soared to USD 134 million in 1980 (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Source: World Bank (1987)

Livestock
Livestock has always been the mainstay of the Somali economy and
remained a primary source of livelihood, predominantly in the North
where majority of the population were nomadic pastoralists. On average, around 60 percent of the Somali people relied on livestock for
their subsistence.13 Similarly, livestock production offered around twothirds of employment and about half of the country’s GDP.14 Livestock
remained the chief export commodity over the course of the modern
history of the Somali State and dominated the nation’s export earnings
and hard currency inflow. A number of studies recorded the share
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of livestock exports in Somalia’s total export earnings as follows: 45
percent (together with the banana exports);15 around two-thirds (66
percent);16 more than 80 percent;17 below 50 percent in the late 1960s
and approximately 90 percent in 1978;18 over 70 percent in a given year
and 91 percent in 1981 alone;19 roughly 80 percent;20 around 98 percent (together with other livestock products, agricultural products, and
fish);21 and 40-85 percent.22
Somali livestock was exported to the Gulf Countries and Saudi Arabia in particular. The largest number of heads were exported during
the Hajj season – when Muslims from all corners of the globe travel to
Saudi Arabia to perform the Hajj (the annual Muslim pilgrimage). The
Somali livestock exports soared in the 1970s due to Saudi Arabia’s oil
boom23 and an increased number of Muslim pilgrims to Saudi Arabia
thanks to improved modes of transport.24 As a result, the livestock
exports became largely vulnerable to external shocks from Saudi Arabia. When Saudi Arabia banned Somali livestock imports in 1983 (or
largely limited its imports until 1988), Somalia’s total export earnings
dropped by 40 percent in 1983 and 44 percent in 1984 as Saudi Arabia
imported about 90 percent of the Somali livestock prior to the ban.25
While livestock exports mostly remained over one million heads in
the 1970-78 period, seldom fluctuations resulted in exports of below
one million and over two million in certain years. For instance, exports
were 2.3 million heads in 1975 followed by only 0.86 million heads in
1976 (Table 1).

198

Muhumed Mohamed Mohomud

Table 1: Somalia: Livestock Exports, 1970-78
In Thousand Heads
Year

Sheep

Goats

Cattle

Camel

Total

1971

608

576

56

24

1,264

1970
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

546
789
684
655

1550
374
461
728

605
828
639
556
754
374
442
723

45
77
70
27
39
76
54
74

26
21
28
24
33
37
35
21

1,222
1,715
1,421
1,262
2,376
861
992

1,546

Source: World Bank (1981)
Livestock production and exports were also affected by natural
calamities, specifically droughts. Droughts led to the perishing of
life animals and in turn reduced their population which also meant
a decrease in the volume of exports. Somalia underwent a serious
drought every 10 to 15 years and the most remarkable one in the
period under study was Dabadheer in 1973-74 whose effect on the livestock population was so enormous that “about 1,000,000 cattle (25% of
total stock), 500,000 camels (6% of the total stock), and 5,700,000 goats
and sheep (20% of the stock) were estimated to have perished.”26 By
the same token, a World Bank report recorded that in 1978 (five years
after the drought), the volume of livestock exports was still lower than
that of the pre-drought years and did not recover fully.27
Livestock exports were also crippled by poor government policies.
When Somalia embraced “scientific socialism” in 1970, livestock and
banana – the two principal export commodities – remained in private hands amid the nationalization of all other economic activities.28
The government policy responses were unsuccessful in encouraging
and subsidizing livestock exports to utilize the expeditiously rising
demand in Saudi Arabia. Relying on tariffs for revenue, “the central
government’s tax revenue from trade taxes was 65%, on average” in
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the 1970s; similarly, “the ratio of international trade taxes to the gross
domestic product was 6-7%.”29
Berbera Port, in the North, was where the majority of the livestock
were exported. For instance, roughly 80 percent of Somalia’s total livestock exports were administered by Berbera Port in the period of the
late 1970s and early 1980s.30 However, as a result of the civil war in the
Northern regions in the late 1980s, the port became out of operation.
Table 2: Somalia: Livestock Exports from Berbera Port, 1967-73
Year

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

Sheep

534,432

741,078

653,526

517,211

552,781

753,669

601,742

Goats

340,944

483,763

669,399

540,869

519,872

749,432

593,339

Cattle

Camel

Total

17,781

1,280,999

41,648

24,314

1,124,042

73,385

18,676

29,412

26,786

31,042

23,542

38,377

47,386

61,930

931,574

1,378,281

22,629

1,142,668

27,507

1,284,518

1,595,162

Source: World Bank (1975)
Banana
Banana, the second most important export product after livestock, is
grown in the fertile land along the Juba and Shabelle rivers in Southern
Somalia. Colonial Italy created, expanded, and modernized banana
production through sizable plantations and irrigation schemes, laying the foundation for commercial exports. Consequently, the Somali
banana was first exported to Italy in 1927.31 Following Somalia’s independence in 1960, Somali farmers were given access to the banana
farms, but Italians still had bigger plantations and produced a considerable share of the exported banana.32 In the early 1960s, the banana
industry employed roughly 25,000 people.33 Despite some progress
in the banana industry in the early 1970s (increased production and
cultivated areas), the industry experienced ample setbacks under the
socialist regime. Even though the government established the National
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Banana Board–which turned out to be ineffective–the total output
dwindled over two-thirds while the cultivated area shrunk over half
between 1973 and 1981.34 Similarly, export earnings from banana fell
considerably in the same period, and Farzin (1988:10) explains the
decline as follows:
This poor export performance was partly due to increased competition in export markets, but principally reflected the dramatic decline
in the area planted and hence in domestic output as a consequence of
inadequate domestic price incentives and shortages of inputs, fuel, and
tractor services during 1975-81.
Figure 2

Source: World Bank (1975)
Given that the banana was produced mainly for exports, as the local
banana consumption was minimal, the level of production depended
on the external demand.35 In consequence of the 1981 SAP (Structural
Adjustment Program) agreement by the Somali Government and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), banana exports recovered and
increased dramatically except two years (1984 and 1985) of flooding
and crop loss. However, Abdi Samatar who studied the impact of SAPs
on the banana industry and Somali economy in general, argues that
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the liberalization of the banana sector improved the production and
exports of the industry but the Somali people were not the primary
beneficiaries of this program:
Liberal reforms in the banana sector did not lead to development,
however, as nearly 75 percent of earnings from exports were realized by overseas interests, depriving Somalia of an important
source of capital for reinvestment (40).
Table 3: Somalia: Banana Production and Exports, 1975-85
Year

Production
(in Thousand
Tons)

Exports
(in Thousand
Tons)

1975

106.0

81.8

1977

65.2

53.8

1976
1978
1979
1980
1981

96.6
69.7
72.2
60.4
59.0

72.5
57.5
55.5
35.4
34.4

Exports
(in Millions of
Somali Shillings)1
80.9
85.1
64.7
70.2
68.5
46.6
66.2

1982

78.7

50.7

153.6

1983

98.9

62.4

234.4

1985

60.0

45,3

871.0

1984

62.2

47.9

283.9

Source: World Bank (1987)
Average official exchange rate for 1985 was US $1=So. Sh. 40.175

1

Other Export Products
Having a coastline of over 3000 km (the longest on mainland Africa)
and largely pastoralist population, Somalia’s fisheries sector is highly
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unexploited. The fisheries share in the GDP is below one percent while
the sector employs around two percent of the population.36 Accounting
for merely two percent of the total export earnings, exports of fish and
its byproducts grew throughout the 1970s as a result of Soviet Union
assistance, but both production and exports dropped in the first quarter of the 1980s due to the breakdown of the Somalia-Soviet relations
in 1978 coupled with tough control on pricing and marketing by the
government.37 Italy and Australia filled the Soviet Union’s shoes and
supported the fishing cooperatives after 1978, but they were not profitable.38 Larger exploitation of the sector started after the 1973-74 Dabadheer drought when many nomadic pastoralists were resettled in fishing
cooperatives. As depicted in Table 4, fish exports were high between
1974 and 1976 where exports exceeded 3000 metric tons in 1976.
Table 4: Somalia: Fish Exports, 1972-78
Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

Exports
(Metric Tons)

Exports (Thousands of
Somali Shillings)1

1,796

12,461

1,343
2,002
2,392
3,250
1,186
1,207

5,198

15,242
11,583

15,616
9,388
2,607

Source: World Bank (1981)
1
Official exchange rate: US$1 = So. Sh. 6.295
Hides and skins were other animal products exported by Somalia.
Although their share in the total export earnings was negligible, they
generated between 9 and 50 million So. Sh. in the period of 1973-78;
their share in total export earnings ranged between 1.8 and 8.6 percent
in the same period.39 Likewise, they generated a mere 11 million So.
Sh. in 1984 but 294 and 704 million So. Sh. in 1985 and 1986, respectively.40 Government policies also undermined the expansion of this
sector which could be a significant source of export earnings. The
government’s Hides and Skins Agency (HASA) had a monopoly in
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gathering and exporting the hides and skins, as well as imposed very
low prices on them which discouraged any private involvement in
this industry.41
Meat and meat products exports were also trivial and their export
earnings were valued between 0.3 and 44 million So. Sh. in 1973-78;
their share in total export earnings ranged between 0.1 and 9.2 percent
in the same period (1981). Furthermore, their exports generated 6.5
and 2.7 million So. Sh. in 1980 and 1983, respectively.42
Frankincense and myrrh, also insignificant export commodities,
were known for Somalia as early as ancient times – Somalia was known
as the Land of Punt. Myrrh, for instance, generated roughly 230 and
253 million So. Sh. of export earnings in 1987 and 1988, respectively.43
Government policies partially crippled this industry as the government-sponsored cooperatives were given a monopoly for exporting
frankincense and myrrh.44
IV. Imports
Being a highly open economy, Somalia imported raw materials, intermediate products, and finished goods as well. Among the wide-ranging
import commodities included food, textile, medicine, transportation,
cement and building materials, equipment, iron and steel, machinery,
petroleum, agricultural inputs, etc.45 Despite the government’s rhetoric
on achieving food self-sufficiency, the local production often failed
to keep up with the rapidly increasing consumption. Consequently,
between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s, “Somalia has become alarmingly, and more than any other country in Sub-Saharan Africa, dependent on imported food.”46 This was a striking fact given that Somalia
primarily had an agricultural and pastoral economy and should have
logically been food self-sufficient, even though it sometimes enjoyed a
food grain sufficiency. Farzin, who is one of the few who deeply studied this topic, captures the reality of Somalia’s shocking food import
dependency in the 1970s and 80s as follows:
Indeed, even with the exclusion of the years of war and drought
from the sample period, the value of food import shows a trend
that has been growing at an annual rate of more than 21 percent. The extent of Somalia's dependency on food import is better
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understood when it is noted that the share of food import in total
volume of food consumption rose from less than 33 percent on
average for 1970-79 period to over 63 percent during the 1980-84
period, implying a trend growth in Somalia's food import dependency at the average rate of 8.3 percent per annum during the
1970-84 period.50
The 1973-74 catastrophic Dabadheer drought and 1977-78 Ethiopian-Somali war refugees also paved the way for food aid and in turn
made Somalia food aid dependent. This foreign food dependency
affected the consumption habits of the population, those in urban
areas in particular, as they became more interested in imported cereals
(rice for example) than locally produced maize and sorghum. In addition, the government partly contributed to this problem as its policies
favored the urban dwellers and hurt the local farmers. The National
Trading Agency (also known as ENC) was mandated to import food to
fill the gap between the local production and consumption, subsidize
food imports, and control the local prices to not be higher than their
import parity prices.47 The irony here is bewildering – the government
promoted a food self-sufficiency rhetoric while at the same time discouraging domestic food production.
In spite of always being higher than the exports, imports were often
restricted by the government either directly or through higher taxes
to address the worsening balance of payments. In the early 1970s, the
imports of certain commodities were cut – tea by 57 percent, wheat
flour by 52 percent, and pasta products by 45 percent.48 However,
as a result of the liberalization policies adopted in the early 1980s,
few products needed prior approval for importation by the mid-1980s;
among them were petroleum, alcohol, explosives, medicines, precious
metals and minerals, and tobacco.49 By the same token, the government’s import tariffs, motivated by revenue generation, were high and
their structure was described as irrational and complicated.50 Mubarak
(1996:133) agrees – “The ex post facto average effective rates were 29%
and 21% in 1975–80 and 1981–88, respectively.” Given that imports
were always higher than the exports, the government used external aid
and debt to fill the gap. What portion of the imports were financed by
aid/loan in the 1980s is summarized here:
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During the 1980s, the bulk of merchandise imports constituted
official grants, mostly in kind, and imports for PIP [Public Investment Program]. In the 1981–88 period, about 41 % of total imports
(including transfer costs) were grants in kind, while about 22%
were financed by loans of PIP. The remainder of the imports,
about 37 %, were cash imports.51
As far as the trade partners are concerned, Somalia imported from
different parts of the World. Here are Somalia imports’ major countries of origin in 1973-78, according to the World Bank (1981): Italy,
the Federal Republic of Germany, France, United Kingdom, USSR,
Kenya, Ethiopia, China, Japan, Thailand, Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia,
the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, and the United States. If
we compare the import value (in millions of So. Sh.) of the regions of
these countries, using the same data and taking 1975 as an example, it
looks like this: Western Europe (499), Eastern Europe (83), Africa (100),
Asia (196), Middle East (62), and Western Hemisphere (33).
V. Trade Balance
The Somali economy experienced chronic trade deficits in the period
of 1960-91 as the value of imports exceeded that of exports at all times.
In 1985, exports were a quarter of imports while the ratio of trade
deficit to GDP was 21 percent.52 As illustrated in Table 5, the economy
suffered from negative trade balances and remained in trade deficits in
1975-85. Imports were four and half times, six and half times, and four
times more than exports in 1983, 1984, and 1985, respectively.
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Table 5: Somalia: Exports, Imports, and Trade Balance
Millions of US$
Year

Exports

Imports

Trade Balance

1976

81.0

176.1

-95.1

1975
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

88.6
71.3

109.5
106.0
134.2
114.0

162.2
256.9
275.5

15,616
394.2
461.0

-73.6

-185.6
-166.0
-288.2
-326.8
-308.0

1982

136.9

422.0

-347.1

1983

100.7

484.0

-349.3

1984

62.0

450.0

-344.0

1985

92.5

362.0

-269.5

Source: World Bank (1987)
It turns out that the nation’s export products and their earnings
could not set off the total imports for a number of reasons. As already
discussed, the Somali livestock economy was dependent on a single
market – Saudi Arabia – which made it vulnerable to the external
shocks from that market – Saudi Arabia’s bans on Somali livestock
imports hardly hit the Somali economy. Additionally, livestock production suffered from natural disasters (chiefly droughts), which reduced
the livestock population. The government policies were not in favor of
the sector as well. The banana industry, on the contrary, suffered from
poor management and lack of investment but then most of the export
profits were acquired by foreign interests when the industry was
invested by SAPs. This was coupled with rapidly increasing domestic
consumption and preference for imported food, mainly in urban areas.
Even though the official rate of the Somali Shillings often appreciated
against the other currencies and Somalia enjoyed improving terms of
trade, which increased cash imports, the economy also suffered from
occasionally declining terms of trade. In most of the available data
from this period, you will come across highly valued official rates of
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the Somali Shillings, not to mention that the liberalization policies
embraced in the early 1980s mandated the devaluation of the Somali
Shillings.
These perennial trade deficits, which were part of a larger balance of
payments deficits, compelled the Somali Government to rely on external aid and borrowing for deficit financing.
Figure 3

VI. Conclusion
This article examined the trade deficits of Somalia in 1960-91. The
study found that Somalia experienced chronic trade deficits throughout the three post-independence decades. Despite food self-sufficiency
rhetoric by the government, the local production failed to keep up
with the rapidly increasing domestic consumption which led to rising levels of imports and food import dependency. Similarly, exports
were undermined by external shocks, inadequate policies, and natural
disasters. Due to the perennial balance of payments deficits, including
trade deficits, Somalia used external aid and borrowing to finance the
deficit.
Notwithstanding some degree of debate, most of the mainstream
economists agree that trade a deficit is not a bad thing per se. According
to Lawrence (2018), “trade deficits are not necessarily bad, do not nec208
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essarily cost jobs or reduce growth, and are not a measure of whether
foreign trade policies or agreements with other countries are fair or
unfair.” He also contends that since international trade enables countries to purchase goods and services at a price lower than the cost
they would be if produced locally or to sell their goods and services
at higher prices in overseas markets than they could be sold local
markets, “a trade deficit that is associated with large volumes of both
imports and exports could actually be more beneficial than a trade
surplus in which trade volumes are low.” Gould and Ruffin (1996) also
conclude that trade deficit has a trivial impact on the long-run economic growth. On the contrary, Mankiw (2006) argues that the trade
deficit is not a problem per se but an indication of low levels of national
savings. Similarly, Alessandaria (2007) contends that a trade deficit is a
good signal as it implies that the country is borrowing for investment.
Trade balance – be it a deficit or a surplus – is therefore an implication
of a nation’s international borrowing/lending position.53
It is true that Somalia’s foreign debt went through the ceiling in
the period under study, but there is no evidence that those loans were
used for productive and profitable investments. They were invested in
some public infrastructure and the correcting deficits. Here lies a large
part of the reasons why trade deficits had persisted.
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